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effect of the decision is, perhaps, best summed up by Justice Black,
who, in a dissent, states: "I do not believe that either the bench,
the bar or the litigants will know what has been decided in this
case-certainly I do not."- The problem is further complicated in
North Carolina due to the fact that the court on rehearing the
Allen case did not refer to the constitutional issues in its opinion.
In any event, the court was equally divided and, therefore, the holding of the case, whatever it may be, is not precedent for future
litigation.
JERRY W. Amos
Associate Editor

Torts-Judicial Abrogation of the Doctrine of Municipal
Immunity to Tort Liability
In Holytz v. City of Milwaukee1 an action was brought by a

three-and-one-half year old infant against the defendant municipality
for injuries sustained when a steel trap door, covering a water meter
pit, fell on her hands. An action was also brought by the infant's
father to recover for medical expenses incurred by him as a result
of his child's injuries, and for damages due to loss of her society
and companionship. The injuries occurred while the infant was
using a playground maintained by the defendant for pre-school aged
children. It was alleged that the employees of the defendant had
negligently allowed the trap door to remain open.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, reversing the trial court which
had sustained the defendant's demurrer, held that the municipality
was not immune from liability for its negligent torts. In so holding,
Wisconsin joined at least four other states2 which have abolished by
continuing its grant, to him of the special privilege . . . of practicing law
in the State." Id. at 865. Two members agreed that the powers conferred
on the bar violated both the first and fourteenth amendments. Finally, a
plurality of four members refused to consider the constitutional issues. Cf.,
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948) and United States v. International
Union UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957) construing 18 U.S.C. § 610 which prohibits any corporation or labor organization from making "a contribution or
expenditure in connection with any election to any political office....
1"367 U.S. at 865.
'17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
' California,see Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Florida,see Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Illinois, see Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) ; Michigan, see Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
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judicial decision the time-honored and deeply engrained doctrine of
municipal immunity to tort liability.'
While the basic principle of governmental immunity is founded
on the English concept that the sovereign can do no wrong,4 the
judicial basis of municipal immunity from tort claims can be traced
to the English case of Russel v. Men of Devon.' In that case an
unincorporated county was relieved of liability for damages which
were caused by the disrepair of a bridge. As one of the reasons for
its decision, the court stated that "it is better that an individual
should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience."'
There is probably no tenet in our law that has been more universally berated by courts7 and legal writers' than the governmental
immunity doctrine. The criticisms are wide-ranging and highly
varied. Some common examples are: that it is unfair to impose
upon the individual the burden of his damage, rather than upon the
entire community where it justly belongs ;9 that by denying a remedy
for a wrong, the doctrine results in the deprivation of life, liberty,
and property without due process of law; x" and that the doctrine
runs counter to a basic concept underlying the law of torts, that is,
that liability follows negligence."
Why has a rule been adhered to so consistently and with so few
exceptions in the face of virtually unanimous criticism? The answer
to this question is embedded in the traditions of the Anglo-American
philosophy of the common law and the doctrine of stare decisis.
' For other notes dealing with the general subject of municipal immunity
from tort liability see Notes, 4 N.C.L. Rlv. 136 (1926), 12 N.C.L. REv. 172
(1934), and 36 N.C.L. REv. 97 (1957).
" See Borchard, Government Liability in Torts, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924).
2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). There is some argument
that this case relied upon an earlier authority from Brookes Abr., but most
historical analyses agree that Men of Devon is the common law basis of
tort immunity. See 17 Wis. 2d at -, 115 N.W.2d at 620.
municipal
0
Id. at 673, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362. Another ground advanced by the court
for allowing immunity was that the defendant was an unincorporated county
and did not have funds to pay damages.
See, e.g., Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 153, 176, 126 N.E.
72, 77 (1919).
' See, e.g., Casner & Fuller, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54
HARV. L. REv. 437 (1941).
' Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480 (1943).'
10Liber

v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 209, 353 P.2d 590, 593 (1960) (dissenting

opinion).
" Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 20,

163 N.E.2d 89, 93 (1959).
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Invariably, in the opinions of the courts upholding the rule of
municipal immunity, one will find a statement to the effect that the
overruling of such a well-established doctrine is a policy question
which should be directed to the legislature and not the court."2 There
are numerous areas of the law, however, where the courts have overruled long-standing common-law doctrines. Most analogous to the
subject under discussion is the judicial abolition of tort immunity
of charitable institutions.1 3 The right of the child to recover from
a third party for alienation of affection and disruption of the family
ciicle,' 4 the recognition of the right of privacy, 5 and the right of
contribution between or among negligent tortfeasors 6 similarly
illustrate areas of the common law which the courts have chosen to
7
change, despite the demands of stare decisis.'

The seemingly invincible barrier to judicial abrogation of
*municipal tort immunity was first broken in the Florida case of
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach."s Subsequently, at least four
other jurisdictions,' 9 including Wisconsin, have joined what now
" See, e.g., Howard v. Tocoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 167, 152
Pac. 1004 (1915), where the court stated that the doctrine had become fixed

as a matter of public policy, and regardless of the reason upon which the rule

was made to rest, any change had to come from the legislature. See also
Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 157 Me. 174, 170 A.2d 687 (1961);
Maffie v. Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
8See, e.g., Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d
276 (1958), where the court, in overruling the doctrine, said that it is a
judicial responsibility to conform to modem concepts and needs, and when
judges of a later generation reach contrary conclusions with those of an
earlier generation, they must take the necessary corrective action. But see
Knecht v. St. Mary's Hosp., 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958), where the court
refused to overrule the doctrine even though judge-made, because it was
firmly fixed in the law of the state, and, therefore, should be abrogated only
by the legislature.
" 1" See, e.g., Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949),
where recovery was allowed. But see Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56
S.E.2d 432 (1949), where recovery was refused.
15 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E.
68 (1905), where the court recognized the right. But see Brunson v. Ranks
Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955), where it was held that
such right should be provided by the legislature and not by the court.
S1 See, e.g., Knell v. Felton, 174 F.2d 662 (D.D.C. 1949), allowing contribution between negligent tortfeasors. But see Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Chapman, 167 Ore. 661, 120 P.2d 223 (1941), following the common-law rule of
ho contribution in the absence of a statute.
17 Generally speaking, the one field in which the courts adhere
strictly to
the doctrine of stare decisis is that of real property, where stability is felt
to be a necessity in order to protect vested rights. See, e.g., Starnes v. Hill,
1, 16 S.E. 1011 (1893).
112 N.C.
I1 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
" California, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
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appears to be a definite trend. In overruling this well-established
common-law rule,- these courts were faced with similar obstacles:
First, in all five jurisdictions as in the great majority of jurisdictions in the United States, the common law had been adopted as the
law of the state either by statute" or by constitutional provision.2 .
Thus, the question arose as to whether the courts were invading the
province of the legislature when they attempted to abolish a particularcommon-law rule. In two of the cases 22 specific reference was made
to this question, but both courts emphatically rejected it as being an
obstruction to the discarding of an unjust rule that the courts themselves had created.'
The existence of legislative enactments24 waiving the immunity
in certain specific circumstances presented another formidable problem. Once again, proponents of the immunity rule argued that the
legislature had pre-empted the field and that judicial action was forbidden. Two cases 25 dealt expressly with this point, but neither
accepted it as grounds for retention of the rule. One court reasoned
that the series of statutes created a trend toward full abrogation
which the court carried to its ultimate,28 while the other simply
visualized them as sporadic efforts to relieve the harshness of the
rule, rather than as comprehensive legislation designed to cover the
field.
The extent to which the abrogation of the doctrine would apply in
the future presented additional problems. The court in the principal
case attempted to anticipate and to resolve these issues. First, the
court extended the abolition only to harms which are torts, and no
" E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5.
2
2

E.g., WIS. CONST. art. 14, § 13.

"Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 255, 111 N.W.2d 1, 23;
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26,-, 115 N.W.2d 618, 624 (1962).
2 In Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 22, the Wisconsin court in
disallowing this argument stated: "The doctrine of governmental immunity
having been engrafted upon the law of the state by judicial provision, we
deem that it may be changed or abrogated by judicial provision."
" E.g., in California: CAL. ED. CODE § 903 (liability of school district for
negligence of employees); CAL. Gov. CODE § 50140 (public agency liability
for damage by mobs); CAL. Gov. CODE § 53051 (public agency liability for
dangerous or defective condition of public property); CAL. VER. CODE
9 17001 (public agency liability for negligent operation of motor vehicles).:
25
Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 218, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89, 93, 359 P.2d 457, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ; Williams v. City of Detroit, 364
N.W.2d 1, 22 (1961).
Mich.Williams
231, 253,v.111
City of Detroit, supra note 25.
T
' Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 218, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89,
93, 359 P.2d 457, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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liability was imposed upon municipalities in the exercise of their
legislative, quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacities. However,
the abolition was not limited to acts of commission but was made to
apply broadly to all torts, including those of omission. 8 Although
the principal case related specifically to a city, the court considered
the abrogation to encompass all public bodies-the state, counties,
cities, villages, towns, school districts, and all other political subdivisions of the state-whether they be incorporated or not. Finally,
the effective date of the decision was set some forty days after the
rendering of the opinion, in order to give governmental units the
opportunity to make financial arrangements to meet the new liability
implicit in the holding. However, the ruling was made to apply to
the principal case so as to prevent the announcement of the new
rule from being dictum, and further, to give the plaintiffs the benefit
of their efforts and expenditures in challenging the old rule.
No doubt, in the near future the North Carolina Supreme Court
will be afforded the opportunity to abolish judicially the rule of
municipal tort immunity. If the court should decide to follow the
trend set by the above-mentioned cases, it will be faced with the
same problems as to judicial abolition of the rule. North Carolina
has, by a reception statute,29 expressly declared that the common
law is in full force in the state, thus presenting the problem of
whether or not this deprives the court of the power to alter the rule.
In the past the North Carolina court has, in numerous cases, steadfastly refused to abolish many common-law doctrines.3 0 As the
court made no specific reference to the reception statute in these cases,
it is impossible to determine if this was a factor in its decision. However, these decisions are significant in that they illustrate the court's
reluctance to overrule deeply engrained common-law rules.
The North Carolina Supreme Court will also be faced with pre8At

least one court limited the abrogation to acts of commission.

Mc-

Andrew v. Mularchuck, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §4-1 (1953).
" E.g., Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (952), upholding rule of no recovery by unemancipated child in suit against parents for
negligent torts; Elliot v. Elliot, 235 N.C. 153, 69 S.E.2d 224 (1952), uphold-

ing rule that the obligation of father to support minor child is not a property
right but is a personal duty terminated by death of father; Sholten v. Sholten,
230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949), upholding rule of no recovery by hus-

band for loss of consortium; Rabb v. Covington, 215 N.C. 572, 2 S.E.2d

705 (1939), upholding rule of implied warranty in sale of food by retailer to
consumer.
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existing legislation on the subject, which will require a decision as
to whether this is indicative of the extent of abrogation desired by the
legislature. The North Carolina Tort Claims Act31 in one fell swoop
abolished the defense of governmental immunity for "negligent
acts"8 2 in suits against state agencies and employees. 83 In addition,
there are several other statutes that waive the defense of immunity
in certain instances.34 On the basis of these statutes the court might
well hold that the legislature has indicated the extent of abrogation
desired by it, thus precluding judicial invasion of this field. But the
line of reasoning adopted by those courts which have overruled the
doctrine offers a sound solution to problems entailed in the judicial
repudiation of municipal tort immunity, and it is believed that North
Carolina, by following this line, can rid itself of an unjust and
anachronistic rule of law.3 5
JAMES M. TALLEY, JR.

GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1958). This statute is commented upon in
A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolinait 1951, 29 N.C.L. REv.
81N.C.

351, 416 (1951).

" The term "negligent torts" has been interpreted by the North Carolina
Supreme Court as including only acts of commission. See, e.g., Flynn v.

State Highway Comm'n, 244 N.C. 617, 94 S.E.2d 571 (1956), discussed in
Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 352 (1958).

" A few other states have a similar statute, but only in New York has
it been construed to waive immunity as to all state agencies and political subdivisions, including municipalities. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8. In Bernadine v.
City of New York, 182 Misc. 609 (Sup. Ct. 1943), rev'd, 268 App. Div. 444,
51 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1st Dept. 1944), aff'd, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604
(1945), the court in construing the act held that the civil divisions of the
state were answerable equally with individuals and private corporations for
wrongs of officers and employees, since the act waived the state's immunity,
and the legal irresponsibility previously enjoyed by these governmental units
was nothing more than an extension of the exemption of liability that the
state had possessed. In Turner v. Gastonia City Bd. of Educ., 250 N.C.
456, 109 S.E.2d 211 (1959), the North Carolina court held the act not
applicable to employees of local units, such as city and county boards of education, because they are not employees of the state.
"IE.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-53 (Supp. 1961), waiver of governmental
immunity by city and county boards of education by securing liability insurance; N.C. GEN.STAT. § 143-300.1 (1958), Industrial Commission to hear
tort claims arising out of negligence of driver of school bus or school transportation service vehicle, when salary is paid out of State Nine Months
School Fund;.N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-54 (1952), duty of governing authorities of municipality to keep streets and bridges in proper repair, governmental
immunity being no defense; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-191.1 (1952), waiver of
governmental immunity by municipality for negligent operation of motor
vehicles by securing liability insurance, waiver being only to extent of amount
of insurance so obtained. This last statute is commented upon in A Survey
of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1951, 29 N.C.L. REv. 351, 421

(1951).

"The oft-quoted statement made by the Washington court in overruling

